I have now been asked my opinion on Sam Harris’ talk, ‘Science can answer moral questions’ (TED talk, Feb 2010), so often that I can no longer withhold it without losing serious face.
Harris’ core idea is not new, although it may be packaged to appear like it is. The basic form of his argument is that of Utilitarianism, in that ‘during moral decision making, something gets maximized’. Accordingly, many of the arguments that can be brought to bear against Utilitarianism can be leveled against Harris’ model.
But what is it that gets maximized? This is one major problem. Using the analogy of Harris’ ethical landscape, what determines the ‘evil’ depths of valleys, the ‘virtuous’ heights of mountain summits? And, more importantly, what is the decision to use a particular measure (‘happiness’/’utility’/’human wellbeing’) grounded on?
Take for instance Harris’ wild exclamation: “Why is it that we don’t have ethical obligations towards rocks?” Don’t we? You see, Harris wants to normalize his ethical landscape with humans as the measure. But how did he come to decide on this particular weighting? And how to determine how, for instance, Argentinian army ants weigh in vis-à -vis anopheles spp. mosquitoes?
Also, Harris understates the importance of knowledge. You see, for his system to find application, we first need to know what the landscape looks like. But as pointed out by G. E. Moore over a century ago, this involves very difficult, usually impossible, predictions about future consequences.
Lastly, it needs to be said that Harris’ talk was unnecessarily inflammatory, and did not paint a fair and representative picture of opposing viewpoints, not to mention Islamic culture [as if there were such a unified thing].
I’ll have to simply disagree with you on this subject. I think Harris is very reasonable. Also, I don’t believe in the fantasy peaches and honey conceptualization of Islam (much less any other Abrahamic/Legalistic faith) that Islamic adherents endorse. It’s very naive just to look at it via face value.
Heya Rob, did not really understand you here. What do you disagree with, exactly? With what I thought of Harris’ philosophy, or what I thought of Harris’ statements about Islam? And what was it that I was naively looking at ‘via face value’? Just want to understand before I respond …
I know Sam is real preachy about his overall disapproval of Islam but it doesn’t mean he’s wrong about the ethics held by Islam itself.
I guarantee you that we would not have the freedom to even be discussing ethics in such a manner if we were natives in Saudi Arabia.
Perhaps, I am even worse than Sam in that I would like ALL legalistic religion more thoroughly criticized. He focuses a lot on Islam because it’s an obvious target with its various states which are under Sharia Law.
There is a vital difference between talking about (1) ‘the ethics of Islam’ and (2) ‘the ethics of Saudi Arabia’. You are confounding the two.
(1) hardly exists, as ‘Islamic culture’ is much too diverse a thing to be used as a meaningful concept. Compare ‘Islamic culture in Istanbul’, ‘Islamic culture in Dakah’, ‘Islamic culture in Sulawesi, a tropical Indonesian island’ and ‘Islamic culture in Riyadh’. A description of the first could include homosexuality, regular alcohol consumption, and prostitution. A description of the fourth could include the ‘strawman’ examples of Harris, as well as the curtailed freedoms to which you allude. I have first-hand experience with these differences, by the way.
(2) can be used to talk loosely about cultural and legal norms within a geographic entity – Saudi Arabia. Incidentally, a cursory examination of history reveals the inimical role of U.S. foreign policy in maintaining the very conditions in Saudi Arabia that westerners such as yourself and Harris mistake for ‘Islamic culture’.
Before assigning agency behind social movements and events to ‘a religion’, one does well to take socioeconomic and historical contexts into careful consideration.
No, I am not confounding it. I am revealing a deeper truth to the matter that is more important than Islam or the politics of Saudi Arabia.
Moderates or liberals of any particular affiliation of a faith do not accurately represent the ethical nature of a religion.
You are using the diversity argument that doesn’t mean anything except that there are people who don’t follow the ethics of Islam (or fill in religion x, y, or z).
We can look more closely at this dichotomous nature of social norms and religious laws if you would like?
I like the thought that asserting/assuming that there “are” norms that science can support is in itself a statement that will help for that to happen. The next step would be how to accomplish this – and Harris says nothing about that. How will values need to be ordered such that they, in their ‘new order’ will be accepted on equal footing with the observations of classical science? This clearly demands a methodology. (As you know I by now have some firm ideas about this.)
Right! But is seems that there is no way around science having to *import* norms from somewhere outside of science.
Only if you think – as you seem to do – that ‘science’ is as it is and cannot change. This (conventional) interpretation of science comes, as you know, from the 17th century’s canons which left only observations (facts, if you like) as legitimate building blocks of science: they can be transferred ‘as is’, also to future users.
Woah! I certainly see that Science can, and has, undergo/ne tremendous change. But can’t it change and all the while steer clear of normative [‘should be’] claims?
On your last question: yes, naturally that would be a possibility.
What do you mean by ‘stay clear of’.
And what, do you reckon, are good examples of the ‘tremendous change’ science has undergone.
By the way: I didn’t refer to research results; I meant changes within science, of the way in which science operates – its tools so to speak.
Also ‘normative’ is a bit strong for my taste. I meant a(n extension of) science that can ‘advise’ its users what to do in order to achieve something that will prove to be desirable, if the user chooses to take the advice.
Some examples of elements in Science that Jelte regards as having undergone ‘tremendous changes’:
(1) The observers role in influencing the form and content of the results; the belief in the possibility of objective knowledge.
(2) Mechanisms that play dominant roles in directing the flow of science. Examples: The post-WWII rise of corporate-industrial interests, the sociology of peer-review and scientific practice generally, the vested interests of peer-review-journal publishers.
(3) The degree of specialization, isolation and segmentation.
(4) …
By the way, I like your idea of recasting the central issue [values as facts] in terms of “‘advise’ [on] what to do in order to achieve something that will prove to be desirable, if the user chooses to take the advice.” BUT, and this is my point: People may disagree on what is desirable, and it may not be possible to appeal to observations to decide on what is.
Joanne> Briefly then, and referring to the idea of a self organising collective that chooses to maintain ‘something’ (for me: the evaluand, as I am interested in evaluation.) IF a group of people apparently attaches value to this ‘something’ by maintaining it against the odds, then that is their evaluation. If, in addition, this happens over time then we may conclude that at least the maintainers find this ‘something’ desirable enough to maintain it as it is. My contention is that such a collective of maintainers constitutes knowledge. Such knowledge is fragile, much more so than classical knowledge.
The rest of the story is for Xmas. It boils down to a task specific ‘translation’ of Kant’s categorical imperative. And, to go back to your point: it argues that such a collective will need to keep searching for new knowledge.
Jelte>> Okay, I think we are on the same page with regards to values|facts! This should prove an important starting point for further discussion.
I believe Sam thinks that understanding the human mind is a start. One of his specialties is neuroscience.
That talk leaves me very uncomfortable. And yes; it’s because, as usual, the x, y and z dimensions in that moral landscape are those defined by culture a la north-western hemisphere, once again imposed on the rest of the world as if it were the only valid value system to have. It’s as if he purposefully takes extreme examples (on which noone would DARE to disagree between the morally ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’) in order to cover this up.
Which leaves me to think that that ‘continuum’ he refers to (in between the desperate sudanese mother and smiley caucasian mother) must be ‘development’ itself? Yes, I think this idea has been around since the 1920’s…
…”it’s because, as usual, the x, y and z dimensions in that moral landscape are those defined by culture a la north-western hemisphere,” etc.
What do you mean by this statement? What do you suggest instead? What do you think is a better value system? Do you think cultural relativism is actually plausible?